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Decred • Assets • Sequoir
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DCPs – Nina Paley
DCPS Continues Service Line Expansion With Acquisition Of
Detailed Analysis of Decred Fork Resistance
There have been several questions regarding how Decred makes minority forked coins, in the sense of Ethereum Classic and Bitcoin Gold, extremely difficult without majority stakeholder approval, and, for all intents and purposes, impossible without also destroying the hybrid nature and security properties of the system in the process. In order to try and explain why this is the case, the following is an analysis that first describes the important aspects of the system as they relate to this topic and then walks through the process of what would happen in a fork attempt under the worst case scenario.
The Proof-of-Stake (PoS) system works by locking up chunks of coins into what is called a ticket. These tickets function as the fundamental building block which allows stakeholders to participate in governance. Once acquired, all tickets are placed into a pool of live tickets after a maturity period. This pool is known as the live ticket pool and has a target size of 40960, but it can grow larger or shrink as tickets are added and removed throughout the course of operation, and the ticket price (stake difficulty) is adjusted, per supply and demand, to try to maintain that target pool size. This is covered more in depth in DCP0001 for readers who want a more thorough treatment. The consensus rules enforce a ticket selection algorithm that works to ensure that ticket selection is both random and impossible for miners to manipulate. It achieves this by deterministically and pseudorandomly selecting 5 tickets from the aforementioned live ticket pool which are eligible to vote on the previous block and that at least 3 of them must be included. The subsidy is reduced if only 3 or 4 votes are included, by 20% and 40%, respectively, in order to discourage miners from ignoring votes and otherwise attempting to game the system. A detailed treatment of the theory behind each of these parameters is beyond the scope of this post, however, it primarily has to do with protection against various adversarial situations. Further, the deterministic pseudorandom ticket selection process is primarily based on seeding it with the hash of the block it's voting on. This implies that, if you're building, say block 100000, on top of block 99999 (hash 00000000000000dab92a8a0c0e706eb74115f0f373669c01ffb4882f9555f494), the chosen tickets are known to every other full node on the network and can't be changed without going back to find a new solution to block 99999 such that it has a different hash (say 00000000000004289d9a7b0f7a332fb60a1c221faae89a107ce3abbd186c386c), which in turn will cause a new set of 5 tickets to be selected for voting eligibility. It is also important to note that stakeholders must be present on a given chain fork at the time of block creation in order to cast their vote when their associated ticket is selected. The act of acquiring a ticket does not mean it automatically votes. This distinction is key because it means that the ticket pool on a minority fork is largely comprised of non-voting tickets which is why the minority chain is unable to continue.
Scenario, Assumptions, and Methodology
With all of that in mind, let's walk through an attempt to create a minority fork that the majority stakeholders don't agree with. Let's also assume that both sides of the attempted fork have equal hash power (so 50% hash power on each fork). Given that a successful vote requires 75% stakeholder approval, in the worst case, 75% of the stakeholders are on the majority chain, while 25% are on the minority chain. Further, let's assume the most recent block at the point of the fork is block 99999. Thus both side of the fork are working on trying to find block 100000, one side on the minority rule set, the other side on the majority rule set. Finally, in order to simplify the description and make it easier to follow the logic, since only 25% of the stakeholders are on the minority chain, let's say that every 4th ticket in the live ticket pool is a stakeholder on the minority chain and the rest are on the majority chain. In other words, ticket numbers 0, 4, 8, 12, 16, 20, 24, ..., 40956 are tickets in the live pool which represent stakeholders on the minority chain, while ticket numbers 1, 2, 3, 5, 6, 7, 9, 10, 11, 13, 14, 15, 17, 18, 19, 21, 22, 23, 25, ..., 40957, 40958, 40959, are tickets in the live pool which represent stakeholders on the majority chain.
The following is the sequence of events that will happen:
The hash power on both chains will try to build a new block on top of block 99999.
Per the above description, in order for this new block to be built on the minority chain, it needs to acquire at least 3 votes from the live ticket pool and the selected votes depend on block 99999.
The tickets required to build block 100000, which is based on 99999 are ticket numbers 17113, 17331, 21307, 21328, and 24903.
As we can see, 4 out of those 5 tickets are stakeholders on the majority chain (ticket numbers 17113, 17331, 21307, and 24903), which means they are going to provide their votes for block 100000 on the majority chain.
The minority chain is only able to acquire 1 vote (ticket number 21328), so it can't build a block 100000, instead, it must go back and find a new solution to block 99999 in order to cause a new set of tickets to be selected.
At this point, the chains now look as follows. The parentheses with the * in this notation indicate blocks that are being worked on.
... -> 99999 -> (100000*) <--- majority stakeholders (75%) are on this chain \-> (99999a*) <--- minority stakeholders (25%) are still on this chain
In other words, the majority chain is now working on block 100000, while the minority chain is stuck trying to find a new solution for block 99999 in order to get a new set of tickets hoping this time they'll be able to get at least 3 votes. Since, per our thought experiment, both chains have equal hash power, we can safely assume that, on average, both block 100000 on the majority chain a new block 99999 (call it 99999a) on the minority chain will be found around the same time.
At this point, the following will happen:
The hash power on the majority chain will try to build a new block on top of the majority chain's block 100000. The votes required for this block are ticket numbers 563, 6766, 21009, 37394, and 37775.
This time around all 5 out of those 5 tickets happen to be stakeholders on the majority chain, which means they are going to provide their votes for block 100000 on the majority chain which allows block 100001 to be built.
The minority chain, now with a new version of block 99999 (99999a) has a new hash, so it ends up requiring ticket numbers 1069, 8007, 16413, 19172, and 31821.
The minority chain is still only able to acquire 1 vote (ticket number 19172), so it must once again go back and find yet another new solution to block 99999 in order to cause a new set of tickets to be selected.
At this point, the chains now look as follows:
... -> 99999 -> 100000 -> (100001*) <--- majority stakeholders (75%) are on this chain \-> (99999b*) <--- minority stakeholders (25%) are still on this chain
In other words, the majority chain is now working on block 100001, while the minority chain is still stuck trying to find yet another new solution for block 99999 in order to get a new set of tickets hoping this time they'll be able to get at least 3 votes. Since, per our thought experiment, both chains have equal hash power, we can again safely assume that, on average, both block 100001 on the majority chain and a new block 99999 (call it 99999b) on the minority chain will be found around the same time.
At this point, the following will happen:
The hash power on the majority chain will try to build a new block on top of the majority chain's block 100001. The votes required for this block are ticket numbers 174, 1999, 12808, 31928, and 38317.
This time, 3 out of those 5 tickets are stakeholders on the majority chain (ticket numbers 174, 1999, 38317), which means they are going to provide their votes for block 100001 on the majority chain which allows block 100002 to be built.
The minority chain, now with a new version of block 99999 (99999b) has a new hash, so it ends up requiring ticket numbers 4653, 15211, 29988, 35175, and 35665.
The minority chain is still only able to acquire 1 vote (ticket number 29988), so it must once again go back and find yet another new solution to block 99999 in order to cause a new set of votes to be selected.
At this point, the chains now look as follows:
... -> 99999 -> 100000 -> 100001 -> (100002*) <--- majority stakeholders (75%) are on this chain \-> (99999c*) <--- minority stakeholders (25%) are still on this chain
In other words, the majority chain is now working on block 100002, while the minority chain is still stuck trying to find yet another new solution for block 99999 in order to get a new set of tickets hoping this time they'll be able to get at least 3 votes.
Fast-forward to Block 100010
The process repeats until, eventually, some variant of block 99999 on the minority chain gets lucky and happens to select 3 tickets that are on the minority chain. This turns out to be roughly 1 in 10 tries. So, fast forwarding a bit to see the chain by the time this happens, the chains would look as follows:
... -> 99999 -> 100000 -> 100001 -> 100002 -> ... -> 100009 -> (100010*) <--- majority stakeholders (75%) are on this chain \-> 99999j -> (100000a*) <--- minority stakeholders (25%) are still on this chain
It should be pretty clear, since both chains have equal hash power, there is no way the minority chain can now ever catch up to the majority chain. Furthermore, the same process is going to repeat for the minority chain's block 100001 where it will have to go back and remine (find new solutions) for its block 100000 over and over until it gets a lucky draw again such that it gets the 3 votes it needs. Consequently, miners are not going to stay on the minority chain because they're never going to be able to become the majority chain and hence would be mining for free.
What if the minority chain gets more than 10x the hash power of the main chain?
Theoretically, if the minority chain with only 25% stakeholder approval had 10x the hash power of the main chain, yes, it could keep up with the majority chain, however, this is not a realistic scenario because of the economic incentives. Mining the minority chain with 10x the hash power effectively means the miners would only be getting 1/10 of the subsidy as they would on the majority chain based on hash power alone, but it's reduced even further by being 1/10 of 60% of the subsidy due to only being able to acquire 3 votes on average. In other words, miners would only receive 6% of the rewards they would by mining the majority chain, or looking it from the other way, they would receive 94% less by mining the minority chain. Putting that into numbers, if a miner had, say 5% of the total network hash power, they could expect to receive roughly 5% of the PoW subsidy per block, or 5% of ~13.89 ~= 0.6945 DCR at the current time. However, on the minority chain, first the subsidy would be 60% of ~13.89 ~= 8.334 DCR, and then that 5% hash power would only be 0.5% of the total hash power on the minority chain, thus 0.5% of ~8.334 ~= 0.04167 DCR. Thus, we can see that 0.04167 DCR is indeed 6% of 0.6945 DCR. PoW mining is very competitive since it is a zero sum game. Most miners, especially those without huge advantages such as free electricity, have very thin margins and are often banking on future appreciation to pick up the slack. Miners would actually have to pay money to mine the minority chain due to the aforementioned effective 94% reduction in income.
Can't somebody just change the consensus rules to ignore the stakeholders?
Yes, it is theoretically possible to do this, but doing so would completely destroy the hybrid system and return the forked currency to effectively being a pure Proof-of-Work system thereby removing any value of the system. It would also undoubtedly no longer be Decred, since, unlike in a pure PoW coin where nobody can really say which chain is the "real" one and which isn't due to lack of a provable and formalized governance system, Decred has a very clear and well understood governance model where the majority of stakeholders make the decision which chain is the real Decred and they do so in an on-chain and cryptographically provable fashion. Further, stakeholders sign up for Decred with the expectation that major consensus decisions are made by the stakeholders themselves. Removing the authority of the stakeholders would be akin to removing Proof-of-Work from a pure PoW coin. In other words, it would completely destroy the security properties of the system. How much confidence are holders going to have in a coin that ignores one of the primary characteristics it claims to offer?
The OSM: A completely anonymous, encrypted messaging app
I'd like to introduce you to the Obsidian Secure Messenger, or as I personally like to call it, the Obscure messenger. The beta is out now, downloadable from the Obsidian Platform's website, click here. As soon as google play support responds on some issues, it will be downloadable from the play store as well. Encryptions This is a private messaging application with Perfect Forward Secrecy (PFS), ensured by encryptions and decentralization in place to ensure no intermediaries can intercept messages at any point between two contacts. Beyond this, there is no need for any personal idenifiers such as email or phone numbers. After installing the application, you will be assigned an Obsidian ID, as shown in the video below (Please excuse the language errors as this was an alpha showing, also this is perfect Germenglish): https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=GnlZl1k6taU The PFS is ensured by several cryptographical layers. Reliant on Elliptic-Curve Diffie-Hellman and Obsidian IDs are related to Curve25519 signing keys. This provides a 128-bit security level. Decentralization With the dawn of Bitcoin, decentralization has become easy to achieve. Holding a minimum set amount of coins, anyone interested in doing so is able to host a so called "master node". All these nodes together create a network, the Obsidian Platform, a privacy focused infrastructure which aims to become an ecosystem of user privacy oriented applications. To incentivize people to keep these nodes running, they are compensated in 10% annual return on their master node coins. If necessary, the team also has coins in reserve to create masternodes; however, with the current popularity of the crypto currencies, there is no need to fear the service going offline any time soon. The nodes will act as servers through which messages are sent. Every message bounces through an x amount of servers before reaching their final destination, after which it is removed from the network. If a message is unable to reach its intended recipient in a specific timeframe, it shall be deleted from the network as well. This ensures that no records of messages exist anywhere but on the senders' and receivers' phones. For anyone that is familiar with the blockchain and scaling, rest assured: The nodes are only used as intermediaries, messages are not sent through the blockchain, but rather through a parallel network. This ensures that, even during times of heavy traffic on the network, messages will still be delivered as quickly as ever. Competition For ease of use, here's an image showing what the Obsidian Messenger provides, compared to the current competition out there: https://imgur.com/a/J6OrG For more information I've created a little 4 page pamphlet. If you have any interest in using this or more technical questions, please ask away or join the Obsidian Community on Discord. By the way, if anyone wishes to test it my ID is 4ZnYJ7tvSo
Mumbai, India: LSD recovered from drug dealer's home turns out to be plain paper
Keep in mind this was written by an Indian reporter for Indian readers. Mumbai: LSD recovered from drug dealer's home turns out to be plain paper http://www.mid-day.com/articles/mumbai-crime-news-lsd-dots-bust-drug-dealers-plain-paper-anc/18231167 May 08, 2017, 15:50 IST | Suraj Ojha PIC - The fake LSD dots recovered from one of the drug dealers' homes What could have been a gigantic LSD bust ended in a short, non-psychedelic trip for the Anti-Narcotics Cell (ANC). Cops from the cell's Kandivli unit had arrested two drug dealers on May 2, and recovered a stash of LSD dots worth Rs 2,30,000. But their lucky streak ended there, as their recovery of 850 LSD dots post the arrest from one of the accused's home turned out to be nothing more than paper. Blotter pic #2 The trip began with the arrest of real estate agent Samson Denson Rozario (30) and student Rohan Raju Ovhal (26). The duo, who are druggies and also sell the psychedelic drug, were held with 46 LSD dots worth Rs 2,30,000. After their arrest, the cops went over to Rozario's home to check if he had more dope stashed away. He did, in a courier from London, which contained what appeared to be 850 LSD dots. Dubious doobie "We were overjoyed to recover the consignment. The consumer pays around Rs 5,000 per dot and according to this rate, the total amount of LSD was more than Rs 42 lakh," said an ANC officer. However, when the officers sent the samples for testing, they realized that the consignment was dubious. The stamp dots were nothing more than mere paper. When they questioned Rozario, he said that he had paid 10 lakh (the currency remains unknown) for the said consignment, but the dealers have cheated him. Sources from ANC confirmed that most of the time, Indian peddlers who order drugs like LSD from abroad get cheated as they have inadequate knowledge of the same. The peddlers usually pay through Bitcoin, a form of virtual currency, which isn't entirely legal worldwide. Friends in high places In this case, Rosario, the main accused, used to order LSD from a London-based drug supplier. Rosario had been given the drug on a recent trip to Nepal. During the same trip, he'd saved a Jordanian tourist from some trouble with locals, after which they became good friends and the Jordanian began sending LSD to Rosario. The drug was sent to Rosario through a courier from Nepal. "We are inquiring with the courier company. Rosario and Ovhal are both drug users and have known each other for several years. Ovhal is pursuing an aviation course," said an officer. Shivdeep Lande, DCP, ANC told mid-day, "We have found 1.3 mg of LSD in Rosario's possession and 1.2 mg in Ovhal's possession. We are investigating their international links and more associates who used to work with them in India and we're also finding if there is any link between a case which was busted previously." The case Lande is referring to is another LSD bust which happened in March. The Kandivli Unit had arrested five youths and recovered 1,400 LSD dots worth R70 lakh. Of the five, one was employed as a producer at an entertainment company, while two were students at reputed colleges.
Apprently Hashie.co had been suspended with its frontpage replaced with an ARG, more on that later. So on chat people were talking about if Hashie was a scam or not, then we noticed the ARG address had 0 bitcoins in it. Then an admin named Queen Elsa came in and said blockchain.info had issues, then all of a sudden the ARG address has 30 BTC in it. So after that a user named anntonop said he was Andreas M. Antonopoulos( a famous bitcoin author ) Queen Elsa asked if he was accualy him and anntonp repliyed with his twitter status. Queen Elsa spilled the beans and said that something bad happened at Hashie so they are playing an ARG. Everyone in chat freaked out about this. After a few minutes she said Hashie had lost all their miners due to hackers. Anntontop replied with miners can't be hacked. Again chat was panicing and screeming that they lost all their money. A lot of bitcoin news writers acually came to watch this fisaco. Queen Elsa then said the ARG would have the infomation on what happened and then said, hashie lost 100 BTC. To me Hashie.co seems like a ponzi scam imgur links of what happend http://imgur.com/a/OkDCphttp://i.imgur.com/SKaSAdr.png?1 anontop's twiter status after Elsa asked for proof https://twitter.com/aantonop/status/549395944744431616 anontop's twiter https://twitter.com/aantonop EDIT: Hashie posted an image of a police report: https://hashie.co/forum/viewtopic.php?f=3&t=12&p=87#p87 Update: It seems that AMhash would be maintiaining all of Hashie's AMHASH miners Update2: Other cloud mining websites are down, maybe its a DDOS? Update3: Here are some chat logs recorded by other people: One of their co-founders: http://justpaste.it/MatthewMyrtle When a Hashie Admin gets confronted: http://justpaste.it/Hashie Update4: Maybe the owner sold the website to someone else? https://www.reddit.com/Bitcoin/comments/2qrz67/i_was_the_owner_of_hashieco_until_josh_garza/
Is Hashie the beginning of a triangular structure that's about to collapse?
I hope you're sitting down and not at one of those fancy sit-stand desks because what I'm going to tell you will probably shock you. Hashie.co, the cloud mining company, was apparently nothing but a ponzi scheme. Antonopoulos tweet about it Screenshots of the chat November Article about Hashie Discussions on it Truly it is amazing that people fell for the ol' "I'll set you up for free, and once you're happy then you can really make money" line. I bet all those free 10 GHS weren't even real. Just numbers in a spreadsheet to hook them. But I digress from my original point, the price is going down and adoption isn't growing fast. Business that take bitcoin are only using it as a conduit for sweet sweet fiat and even the ones that don't are reporting shit numbers. Is Hashie the beginning? Will other pieces of the puzzle start to fall and crumble? Will scams that have thrived in this ecosystem full of fresh hosts start to just die off one by one? Could this be the beginning of the end?
odinn on Aug 21 2015: -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Hash: SHA1 This is a simple post. Who's got visualizations of votes? One I've seen that I liked was http://bipsxdevs.azurewebsites.net/ This just covered how developers feel about the various BIPs though. A visualization I would like to see would include: pie graph(s) of what % are voting for (BIP 100, BIP 101, 8MB, BIP sipa etc) based on what's published in blocks. Has anyone hacked up such a thing which would describe miner voting, etc. visually in real time? http://abis.io ~ "a protocol concept to enable decentralization and expansion of a giving economy, and a new social good" https://keybase.io/odinn -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: GnuPG v1 iQEcBAEBAgAGBQJV1prZAAoJEGxwq/inSG8CsN0IAJeHH7iNO7P77pJIDWbRXY1c 4TUcxeu8Z31OwoR8expv8qLPPGQnO+YbUnwCCSmya9YohA+sDQPoMsbnb7M/k8No KCoXr5FRrb67c/8k7zVHoXbwlQ2TWRLABEqHS2wA+UuHEOHQewjkpds5HMLc5rRW mGWaa0bkE54XIQjbDgPOrg4yM7DizO45n4ue1yuntKCgL8Few5LC39IFsTxaQHDj M8ljBV/XhZ8oJiOje43o+2nxDbmPh9bACt8EqG6Y2jmfY6jDWqDcp+tpvCUmdD1N TIBRjSDNFviXQFXLDhtjDCF8QwegA8Zu+YYJMwroRzsLXEdQs1SBK2cOiVE73nA= =mSJl -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- original: http://lists.linuxfoundation.org/pipermail/bitcoin-dev/2015-August/010528.html
DCPs 0002 e 0003 (Lightning Network) Para implementar a Lightning Network , uma criptomoeda precisa suportar algumas operações com semântica bem específica. Em particular, ela precisa implementar a possibilidade de cálculo de hashes SHA256 e um recurso chamado Relative Lock Time que permite estabeler quando uma entrada pode ser gasta na rede. Defined Benefit vs Defined Contribution Because retirement has become a very big concern in today's tough times, many are asking as to what type of pension plan All DCPs include clear documentation and motivation for the change, as well as working code and evidence of a tested implementation. The DCP system is similar to Bitcoin’s BIP system, except that approved DCPs are automatically adopted by the network at the end of the voting period. DCPs are similar to BIPs in Bitcoin. DCPs are design documents describing protocol or consensus changes to Decred. After a DCP is written new software which implements the proposed change developed and released. Once released the on-chain governance process begins. Content provided by: I had no problem formatting and copying DCPs onto most external hard drives. The exception was flash drives, aka thumb drives; these overheated and usually failed. It’s a pity, since flash drives are so small and convenient. But I found some relatively inexpensive 320GB USB3 portable hard drives, and made enough DCPs to satisfy film festivals.
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